Aristotle

Aristotle 
Zacatecas
Wittgenstein
Turkey
Russell
The Key to Rebecca
Logical Positivism
History 
Bacon
Alex Wolff
Izaak Walton

Jas.2: 24
"Ye see then how that by works a man is justified, and not by faith only."

Aristotle

"Die Welt ist alles, was der Fall ist. The world is everything that is the case."~~~Wittgenstein

 "There are interpretations that see the Tractatus as espousing realism, i.e., as positing the independent existence of objects, states of affairs, and facts. That this realism is achieved via a linguistic turn is recognized by all (or most) interpreters, but this linguistic perspective does no damage to the basic realism that is seen to start off the Tractatus (“The world is all that is the case”) and to run throughout the text (“Objects form the substance of the world” (TLP 2.021)). Such realism is also taken to be manifested in the essential bi-polarity of propositions;"~~~Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

 

Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russel and eventually Ludwig Wittgenstein led positivism into a new era – the era of the linguistic turn – by focusing on the statements which we have to make wherever we are concerned with “facts” and wherever we construct models that refer to facts.

The language of logic became important here. A statement of a fact is of scientific value as soon as we can think of a verification or a falsification, of research to substantiate or dismiss this statement. What you have stated can turn out to be “the case” – as in a “positive” medical test result in which anti-bodies were detected, or it can turn out to be “not the case” as in a negative test result, when you show no signs of the infection.

The area of statements that “make sense” in a research project is apparently wide. “Earth has got two moons” is a statement that makes sense in a scientific exploration, even though we have already noted that this is not the case. We can easily discuss the requirements of a meaningful statement (meanigful in the sciences) and we can already state that those statements that turn out to be positively true are a logical subset of all the imaginable statements of things as they could perhaps be.

 

 

Max Verstappen, Red Bull

 

 

 

 

 

 

Acropolis, Athens

EL CASTILLO - The Temple of Kukulcan, Chichén Itzá, Mexico 

The Mayans succeeded in an almost impossible mission with the completion of their structures at Chichén Itzá. A poetic combination of form, style, function, religion, philosophy, mathematics and geometry. A true symbiosis of all of their intelligence and art in one location, to be studied and admired by all that visit. 

By far the most impressive structure of  the complex is the "Pyramid of Kukulcan" * (usually called "El Castillo").  This is a square-based, stepped pyramid approximately 30 meters tall (with the temple on top), constructed by the Mayans ca 1000-1200 AD, directly upon the multiple foundations of previous temples. It was mysteriously abandoned along with the surrounding city of Chichen Itza by 1400 AD.

* Kukulcan is the Mayan name for the Feathered Serpent God (also known as Quetzalcoatl to the Aztecs).

The pyramid has special astronomical significance and layout.  Each face of the pyramid has a stairway with ninety-one steps, which together with the shared step of the platform at the top, add up to 365, the number of days in a year. These stairways also divide the nine terraces of each side of the pyramid into eighteen segments, representing the eighteen months of the Mayan calendar. 

The pyramid's design reflects the equinoxes and solstices of our solar year in a spectacular game of light and shadow. During the equinoxes, the setting sun casts a shadow of a serpent on the northern steps of the pyramid.

For a thousand years, the slanting rays of the setting sun have played a spectacular shadow and light game with this great Mayan pyramid. During the equinoxes, at the appointed hour, the shadow of the Feathered Serpent, Kukulcan appears on the northern stairway...and vanishes.

"the great bulk of necessary work can never be anything but painful"~~~Bertrand Russell

 'And when men wandered from the central plaza out to the edge of town they saw workmen, Indians mostly, patiently cutting through the rocky earth to provide foundations for a building that would be of surprising size. The GREY-CLAD cleric in charge verified the news."It's to stand here...just as you see it forming." '~~~JAMES A. Michener: TEXAS Ch.2 THE MISSION p.73

Catedral Basílica de la Asunción de María de Zacatecas, Zacatecas.

1729-1772

"the great bulk of necessary work can never be anything but painful"~~~Bertrand Russell

Wild Turkey Head

"Now, as there are many actions, arts, and sciences, their ends also are many; the end of the medical art is health, that of shipbuilding a vessel, that of strategy victory, that of economics wealth. But where such arts fall under a single capacity- as bridle-making and the other arts concerned with the equipment of horses fall under the art of riding, and this and every military action under strategy, in the same way other arts fall under yet others- in all of these the ends of the master arts are to be preferred to all the subordinate ends; for it is for the sake of the former that the latter are pursued."~~~Aristotle: Nichomachean Ethics, Bk.1

Bertrand Russell on Fearing Thought

The Compleat Angler by Izaak Walton

Lord Bacon

The Key To Rebecca; Zuleika Rivera

THE KEY TO REBECCA, Isaac or Constantine XI, Turkey?

El ruiseñor, en todas las lenguas del orbe, goza de nombres melodiosos (nigtingale, nachtigall, usignolo), como si los hombres instintivamente hubieran querido que éstos no desmerecieran del canto que los maravilló. Tanto lo han exaltado los poetas que ahora es un poco irreal; menos afín a la calandria que al ángel. Desde los enigmas sajones del Libro de Exeter (“yo, antiguo cantor de la tarde, traigo a los nobles alegría en las villas”) hasta la trágica Atalanta de Swinburne, el infinito ruiseñor ha cantado en la literatura británica; Chaucer y Shakespeare lo celebran, Milton y Matthew Arnold, pero a John Keats unimos fatalmente su imagen como a Blake la del tigre.

Chess: "Turkey" "Russell" "The Key to Rebecca" "Alex Wolff" "History" "Bacon" "Logical Positivism" Aristotle" "Chicchen Itza" "Zacatecas"

Turkey

Turkey
Russell
The Key to Rebecca
Logical Positivism
History 
Bacon
Alex Wolff
Izaak Walton

Jas.2: 24
"Ye see then how that by works a man is justified, and not by faith only."

"the great bulk of necessary work can never be anything but painful"~~~Bertrand Russell

Wild Turkey Head

"Now, as there are many actions, arts, and sciences, their ends also are many; the end of the medical art is health, that of shipbuilding a vessel, that of strategy victory, that of economics wealth. But where such arts fall under a single capacity- as bridle-making and the other arts concerned with the equipment of horses fall under the art of riding, and this and every military action under strategy, in the same way other arts fall under yet others- in all of these the ends of the master arts are to be preferred to all the subordinate ends; for it is for the sake of the former that the latter are pursued."~~~Aristotle: Nichomachean Ethics, Bk.1

Bertrand Russell on Fearing Thought

The Compleat Angler by Izaak Walton

Lord Bacon

Chess: "Turkey" "Russell" "The Key to Rebecca" "Alex Wolff" "History" "Bacon" "Logical Positivism"

Time

Positively so!
Russellian Semantics
John 14:6
"Jesus saith unto him, I am the way, the truth, and the life: no man cometh unto the Father, but by me."

More Russell Lupins.
Russell Lupines

Chess: "Time"

Logical Atomism
by Bertrand Russell

The philosophy which I advocate is generally regarded as a species of realism, and accused of inconsistency because of the elements in it which seem contrary to that doctrine. For my part, I do not regard the issue between realists and their opponents as a fundamental one; I could alter my view on this issue without changing my mind as to any of the doctrines upon which I wish to lay stress. I hold that logic is what is fundamental in philosophy, and that schools should be characterized rather by their logic than by their metaphysics. My own logic is atomic, and it is this aspect upon which I should wish to lay stress. Therefore I prefer to describe my philosoophy as "logical atomism," rather than as "realism," whether with or without some prefixed adjective.
A few words as to historical development may be useful by way of preface. I came to philosophy through mathematics, or rather through the wish to find some reason to believe in the truth of mathematics. From early youth, I had an ardent desire to believe that there can be such a thing as knowledge, combined with great difficulty in accepting much that passes as knowledge. It seemed clear that the best chance of finding indubitable truth would be in pure mathematics, yet some of Euclid's axioms were obviously doubtful, and the infinitesimal calculus, as I was taught it, was a mass of sophisms, which I could not bring myself to regard as anything else. I saw no reason to doubt the truth of arithmetic, but I did not then know that arithmetic can be made to embrace all traditional pure mathematics. At the age of eighteen I read Mill's Logic, but was profoundly dissatisfied with his reasons for accepting arithmetic and geometry. I had not read Hume, but it seemed to me that pure empiricism (which I was disposed to accept) must lead to scepticism rather than to Mill's support of received scientific doctrines. At Cambridge I read Kant and Hegel, as well as Mr. Bradley's Logic, which influenced me profoundly. For some years I was a disciple of Mr. Bradley, but about 1898 I changed my views, largely as a result of arguments with G.E. Moore. I could no longer believe that knowing can make any difference to what it is known. Also I found myself driven to pluralism. Analysis of mathematical propositions persuaded me that they could not be explained as even partial truths unless one admitted pluralism and and the reality of relations.An accident led me at this time to study Leibniz, and I came to the conclusion (subsequently confirmed by Couturat's masterly researches) that many of his most characteristic opinions were due to the purely logical doctrine that every proposition has a subject and a predicate. This doctrine is one which Leibniz shares with Spinoza, Hegel, and Mr. Bradley; it seemed to me that , if it is rejected, the whole foundation for the metaphysics of all these philosophers is shattered. I therefore returned to the problem which had originally led me to philosophy, namely, the foundations of mathematics, applying to it a new logic derived largely from Peano and Frege, which proved (at least, so I believe) far more fruitful than that of traditional philosophy.
In the first place, I found that many of the stock philosophical arguments about mathematics (derived in the main from Kant) had been rendered invalid by the progress of mathematics in the meanwhile. Non-Euclidean geometry had undermined the argument of the transcendental aesthetic. Weierstrass had shown that the differential and integral calculus do not require the conception of the infinitesimal, and that therefore, all that had been said by philosophers on such subjects as the continuity of space and time and motion must be regarded as sheer error. Cantor freed the conception of infinite number from contradiction, and thus disposed of Kant's antinomies as well as many of Hegel's. Finally Frege showed in detail how arithmetic can be deduced from pure logic, without the need from any fresh ideas or axioms, thus disproving Kant's assertion that "7+5=12" is synthetic--at least in the obvious interpretation of that dictum. As all these results were obtained, not by any heroic method, but by patient detailed reasoning, I began to think it probable that philosophy had erred in adopting heroic remedies for intellectual difficulties, and that solutions were to be found merely by greater care and accuracy. This view I have come to hold more and more strongly as time went on, and it has led me to doubt whether philosophy, as a study distinct from science and possesed of a method of its own, is more than an unfortunate legacy from theology.

Frege's work was not final, in the first place because it applied only to arithmetic, not to other branches of mathematics; in the second place because his premises did not exclude certain contradictions to which all systems of formal logic turned out to be liable. Dr. Whitehead and I in collaboration tried to remedy these two defects, in Principia Mathematica, which, however, still falls short of of finality in some fundamental points (notably the axiom of reducibility). But in spite of its shortcomings I think that no one who reads this book will dispute its main contention, namely, that from certain ideas and axioms of formal logic, by the help of the logic of relations, all pure mathematics can be deduced, without any new undefined idea or unproved propositions.. The technical methods of mathematical logic, as developed in this book, seem to me very powerful, and capable of providing a new instrument for the discussion of many problems that have hitherto remained subject to philosophic vagueness. Dr. Whitehead's Concept of Nature and Principles of natural Knowledge may serve as an illustration of what I mean